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15 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Thompson of National Archives Re OSS Material

- 1. On 10 May I met with Mr. Allen Thompson of National Archives as a follow-up to Mr. Coffey's meeting of 28 April regarding declassification of 30-year-old materials (see Mr. Coffey's MFR dated 8 May 1972, DDS/72-1853).
- 2. Mr. Thompson stated that at this moment the Archives had no money for carrying forward the declassification program, but the U. S. Archivist was meeting on the "hill" at this time outlining the need for an appropriation. They hope to start hiring personnel as soon as the money is appropriated. They plan to hire young college graduates perhaps at the GS-09 level. These individuals would do an initial screening of the material held by the Archives. This screening would be based on the guidelines furnished by the various agencies. (Attached is a copy of suggested Department of State guidelines recarding R&A. OSS material).
- 3. It is hoped that the initial screening will result in the declassification of about 50% of the material held. At this stage we will be called upon to review the remaining holdings to determine
 - a. Any additional material that can be declassified and
 - b. determine what material should remain classified, for how long and the reason for continued classification.
- 4. At this stage the DCI will have to send a letter to the Archivist regarding the material to remain classified.
- 5. The National Archives has the following known material that we would be interested in:

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- a. 930 cubic feet of R&A material.
- b. 24 cubic feet of records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development dealing with development of instruments for sabotage and esplonage.
- c. 44 cubic feet of records prepared by OSS's Art Investigation Unit.
- 6. In addition to material at the National Archives we hold here in the Agency about 6000 feet of OSS records that will have to be screened and determination made as to what can be declassified and what must remain classified.
- 7. Material that is declassified can then be sent to the National Archives and persons requesting access to such material may then be referred to them.
- 8. Material that is to remain classified would be retained in the Agency.
 - 9. Action Required by the Agency:
 - a. Develop guidelines to be furnished the National Archives on what OSS material may be declassified and what requires continued classification.
 - b. Develop guidelines for the screening of the 6000 feet of OSS material held here.
 - c. Determine method to screen material here in Agency and material as it becomes available at the National Archives. (It is suggested that several retired Agency officers with OSS experience be hired on contract to perform this review).

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Attachment - As Stated

SECTION

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SUGGESTED DEPARTMENT OF STATES DECLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES

The following guidelines for declassification are applicable to all security-classified records created by the Department of State and all records under the exclusive administrative control of the Department of State.

All such records predating January 1, 1946, are hereby declassified except:

- 1. Intelligence and counterintelligence documents and reports containing information on:
 - (a) Identifiable individuals as sources of the intelligence information (as distinguished from an agency or organization as a source of the intelligence information),
 - (b) Nethods and/or techniques of collecting intelligence information.
- 2. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Research and Analysis Branch records containing the following types of information in addition to No. 1 above:
 - (a) Names of OSS agents;

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- (b) Information on the assignment of OSS personnel to overseas areas:
- (c) Information on the allocation and disbursement of funds for OSS operational activities;
- (A) Detailed information on the organizational structure of elements of the OSS operating abroad;
- (e) Information on all operational activities of the OSS including, but not limited to, cover and deception and escape and evasion activities.